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Moral education and indoctrination: replies to John White and 
John Tillson 
 
 
ABSTRACT: John White and John Tillson have both raised objections to the theory of moral 
education I have recently advanced. Here I reply to their objections and offer some critical 
remarks on the alternative accounts of moral education they propose. 
 
 
In recent work (Hand, 2014a, 2014b, 2018), I have attempted to solve the problem for 
moral education posed by reasonable disagreement about morality. The problem is that, 
insofar as the content and justification of morality are matters of reasonable 
disagreement, the aim of bringing it about that children subscribe to moral standards 
and believe them to be justified cannot be realised except by means of indoctrination. 
The theory of moral education I defend purports to solve this problem by showing that, 
although much in the moral realm is rationally contentious, some basic moral standards 
enjoy the support of a sound justificatory argument. Subscription to a familiar set of 
moral prohibitions and requirements is needed to ameliorate what David Copp calls the 
‘problem of sociality’ (Copp, 2009, p.22) – the standing propensity of human social 
groups to outbreaks of conflict and breakdowns in cooperation. Parents and teachers 
can cultivate children’s subscription to these standards on the basis of this argument 
without incurring the charge of indoctrination. John White (2016, 2017) and John 
Tillson (2017) have both taken issue with my view. In this article I reply to their 
objections and offer some critical remarks on their own educational recommendations. 
 
My discussion is divided into four sections. In the first, I defend my framing of the 
problem for moral education against White’s objection that there is something awry 
with my account of indoctrination. In the second, I respond to the accusation, made by 
both White and Tillson, that the problem-of-sociality justification for basic moral 
standards is ‘foundationalist’ and yet fails to meet the desiderata of a foundationalist 
justification. In the third, I address the worry, also raised by both critics, that the 
justification founders on a free-rider problem. And in the fourth, I advance some 
objections of my own to the alternative accounts of moral education White and Tillson 
sketch. 
 
Indoctrination 
 
The concept of indoctrination is notoriously contested and White has long defended the 
idea that indoctrinatory teaching is distinguished by an illegitimate intention on the part 
of the indoctrinator. Back in 1967, he proposed that the indoctrinator must be trying to 
induce belief ‘in such a way that nothing will shake that belief’ (White, 1967, p.181). His 
latest proposal is that the indoctrinator must be ‘trying to prevent reflection on a belief’ 
(White, 2016, p.452). As the mere fact of reasonable disagreement about morality gives 
us no reason to think that moral educators must have belief-insulating or reflection-
preventing intentions, my ‘problem’ for moral education may be illusory. 
 
I disagree with White that his favoured definition of indoctrination captures ‘how the 
term is standardly used’ (ibid.). In my estimation, we standardly apply the term to 
teaching processes that result in non-rationally-held beliefs, regardless of what the 
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teacher intends. That is to say, I take the distinguishing feature of indoctrination to be a 
certain kind of consequence, not a certain kind of intention. But nothing much turns on 
which of us is right about ordinary usage. What matters is whether teaching rationally 
contentious beliefs as if they were known to be true results in those beliefs being non-
rationally held, and whether educators therefore have a duty to avoid such teaching. 
 
I think it does and they do. Beliefs are matters of reasonable disagreement when the 
evidence and argument bearing on them is subject to more than one plausible 
interpretation. If a teacher wishes to persuade a learner that such beliefs are true, she 
cannot do so by rational demonstration, by producing compelling evidence or decisive 
arguments. She must instead resort to non-rational means of persuasion, to some form 
of manipulation or psychological pressure, to impart the desired beliefs. But beliefs into 
which a learner has been cajoled, bullied or seduced are beliefs she has come to hold on 
a basis other than the force of evidence and argument. They are, that is to say, beliefs she 
has come to hold non-rationally. 
 
Teaching of this kind ought to be avoided because of the difficulty of shifting or 
amending non-rationally-held beliefs. Insofar as beliefs are held on the basis of evidence 
and argument, they are open to revision and correction. One is prepared to modify or 
relinquish them in the light of fresh evidence, or fresh appraisals of old evidence. Insofar 
as beliefs are held non-rationally, on the other hand, they are highly resistant to 
reassessment. Because they are not founded on evidence and argument, the discovery of 
counter-evidence and counter-argument has little or no effect on them. Here, observes 
John Wilson, ‘we have taken over, or put to sleep, a central part of the child’s personality 
- his ability to think rationally in a certain area’ (Wilson et al, 1967, p.174). 
 
White demands ‘some account’ of why indoctrination is ‘a bad thing’, and considers it an 
advantage of his definition that we can readily see what is wrong with teaching that 
‘aims at preventing people from thinking for themselves’ (White, 2016, p.452). My reply 
is that we can see just as readily what is wrong with teaching that results in people being 
prevented from thinking for themselves, whether that is intended or not. 
 
‘Foundationalism’ 
 
The problem-of-sociality justification purports to show that there are good non-moral 
reasons for subscribing to basic moral standards. It purports, that is to say, to give a 
satisfactory answer to the question ‘Why be moral?’. If the justification is sound, it 
should suffice to persuade a rational agent who does not yet subscribe to moral 
standards that she ought to do so, and to dispel the doubts of a rational agent who 
subscribes to moral standards but wonders if she might do better without them. 
 
A standard specifies something to be done or not done; it is ‘anything that is expressible 
by an imperative’ (Copp, 1995, p.20). A person subscribes to a standard when she 
intends to comply with it, feels good about complying with it and bad about failing to 
comply with it, and habitually does comply with it. And subscription to a standard is 
moral when it is universally-enlisting and penalty-endorsing; that is, when the subscriber 
wants and expects everyone to comply with it and supports some kind of punishment 
for non-compliance. 
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Morality is optional for human beings. We have a choice about whether or not we go in 
for universally-enlisting and penalty-endorsing subscription to standards. If we do go in 
for it, we should have good reasons for doing so. Because morality involves not just 
holding ourselves to certain standards but holding everyone else to them too – and on 
pain of punishment – we should insist on a sound justification for it. 
 
One such justification is to be found in our collective need to ameliorate the problem of 
sociality. The problem of sociality arises because of three contingent but permanent 
features of the human condition. These features, sometimes described as the 
‘circumstances of justice’, are (i) rough equality, (ii) limited sympathy and (iii) moderate 
scarcity of resources. Discussions of these features or circumstances are to be found in 
the writings of many philosophers, including Thomas Hobbes (1929 [1651]), David 
Hume (1896 [1739]), H.L.A. Hart (1994 [1961]), G.J. Warnock (1971), John Rawls (1971) 
and J.L. Mackie (1977). It is not difficult to see why the combination of these features is a 
recipe for trouble. Because we are roughly equal in strength and intelligence, we each 
know that we have a reasonable chance of coming out on top in any physical or strategic 
conflict, and we are each aware that those around us know the same thing about their 
chances. Because our sympathy for strangers is limited, in the sense of being notably 
weaker than self-love and familial love, we are inclined to prioritise the safety and 
satisfaction of ourselves and our loved ones over the safety and satisfaction of others. 
And because resources are not abundant enough to satisfy everyone’s needs and wants, 
we are forced into competition with each other for access to goods in short supply. The 
clear implication of these circumstances, taken together, is that there is, in human social 
groups, a standing propensity to outbreaks of conflict and breakdowns in cooperation. 
 
While we are often motivated directly by sympathy and self-interest to cooperate with 
each other and refrain from harming each other, these motives are not sufficient to the 
task of sustaining cooperation and averting conflict. They do not reliably yield peace and 
productivity. To ameliorate this problem we need a supplementary kind of motivation 
for keeping to cooperative agreements and treating each other in non-harmful ways. We 
need the kind of motivation that subscription to moral standards provides. The basic 
moral standards justified by this argument include prohibitions on killing and causing 
harm, stealing and extorting, lying and cheating, and requirements to treat others fairly, 
keep one’s promises and help those in need. To deal with the danger to each person of 
others coming ‘to dispossesse, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour, but 
also of his life, or liberty’ (Hobbes, 1929 [1651], p.95), there must be standards that 
afford basic protection to people and their property; and to overcome the distrust that 
threatens to make us ‘lose our harvests for want of mutual confidence and security’ 
(Mackie, 1977, pp.111), there must be standards that oblige us to be fair, honest and 
reliable in our dealings with each other, and to extend each other a helping hand in 
times of need. 
 
This, then, is the justification for subscribing to basic moral standards I propose we 
should offer to children, alongside our attempts to cultivate in them the conative, 
affective and behavioural dispositions in which subscription to those standards consists. 
An objection to this proposal advanced by both White and Tillson is that the problem-of-
sociality justification is ‘foundationalist’ and yet fails to meet the desiderata of a 
foundationalist justification. Here is Tillson: 
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Hand takes a foundationalist approach to moral epistemology. According to such 
accounts, ‘a moral belief is justified if and only if it is either self-justifying or bears an 
appropriate inferential relation to a belief that is self-justifying’ (McMahan, 2000, 
p.110). To fill this role of a self-justifying moral belief, Hand appeals to what he calls 
‘the problem of sociality’… I deny that Hand has identified a foundational moral truth. 
(Tillson, 2017, pp.169-70) 
 
White too sees me as taking a ‘foundationalist approach’ (White, 2017, p.340) but 
shirking the obligation to supply a self-justifying foundation. He argues as follows: 
 
As Hart sees it, if we begin from the – reasonable – assumption that human beings 
should continue to survive, the preconditions of their continuing survival also have to 
be in place, and these include the moral prohibitions in question… Hand’s theory of 
moral education rests on this assumption. A devotee of rationalism will press further 
and ask why there should be continued survival… If the supporter of survival were 
able to produce a further justification, that, too, if sound, would have to be a 
normative statement. We are in the territory of the infinite regress. It was to stop this 
that intuitionists of old posited their self-evident starting points, and that Richard 
Peters followed Kant in claiming justifications embedded in the presuppositions of 
moral injunctions. Hand offers us no such remedy. (White, 2016, pp.451-2) 
 
Now, just what does and does not count as foundationalism in moral theory is far from 
clear. I hold that there are good non-moral reasons for subscribing to moral standards; 
if, for some, that is reason enough to call my view ‘foundationalist’, I shall not object to 
the label. But it is plain that White and Tillson want more from a foundationalist moral 
theory than this. What they seem to want is an account of how and why anything at all 
gives us reason to act. That, at any rate, is the implication of White’s insistence that the 
foundationalist will ‘press further’ than the survival value of morality and ask what 
reason there is to survive. But the justification for morality I defend does not purport to 
justify any and every exercise of practical reason; in that sense it is a rather less 
ambitious theoretical undertaking than White and Tillson take it to be.  
 
The problem-of-sociality justification assumes that people have reason to pursue the 
things they want – and that they want a wide variety of things. It assumes, too, that they 
have reason to comply with the standards they subscribe to – and that they subscribe to 
standards of many different kinds. It asks whether a person who does not yet subscribe 
to moral standards, and therefore does not yet have reason to comply with them, has 
any good reason to change that state of affairs. And it concludes that she does: for her 
own sake and the sake of those she cares about, she has reason to take seriously the 
propensity of human social groups to outbreaks of conflict and breakdowns in 
cooperation, and to recognise that ameliorating the problem requires universally-
enlisting and penalty-endorsing subscription to some basic standards of conduct. 
 
So Tillson is right that I have not produced ‘a self-justifying moral belief’: indeed, I take it 
as read that morality is not self-justifying. And White is right that I have not attempted 
to justify the non-moral reasons invoked to justify moral subscription: it is not the force 
of those reasons on which the question ‘Why be moral?’ casts doubt. The problem-of-
sociality justification may or may not be a kind of foundationalism, but it is not the kind 
White and Tillson have in their sights. 
 5 
 
The moral free-rider 
 
Another objection to the problem-of-sociality justification advanced by both White and 
Tillson is that it founders on a free-rider problem. White writes: 
 
Suppose an articulate student in a Hand-based moral education programme says ‘I 
can see why if there were no rules forbidding things like breaking promises and 
stealing, social life would break down, but if I steal sweets from the newsagents after 
school that won’t cause such chaos. So the likelihood of social breakdown is not a 
reason for me not to steal, however cogent a reason it might be in some more 
general way. I don’t have an interest in holding myself to a rule of conduct like this 
one.’ Since, on Hand’s view, moral education involves giving learners reasons why 
they should follow moral rules, he needs to say more than he does. (White, 2016, 
p.453) 
 
And Tillson puts it like this: 
 
Hand’s theory fails to address the problem of the free-rider. That is, it fails to address 
the sneaky strategy one might have of (in one’s self-interest) disregarding the 
requirements of morality where it will go unnoticed, while benefitting from other 
people following them. (Tillson, 2017, p.170)i 
 
Let me begin with a point of clarification. The problem-of-sociality justification is 
supposed to give people a non-moral reason for subscribing to moral standards, not an 
in-the-moment reason to comply with them. The thought is not, of course, that a child 
tempted to steal sweets from the newsagents after school might be dissuaded from 
doing so by the prospect of a breakdown in social life. What should dissuade her in the 
moment is her subscription to the standard ‘do not steal’ – her commitment to not 
stealing, her habit of resisting the temptation to steal, her aversion to the guilt and 
shame attendant on theft. The thought, rather, is that she may, from time to time, stand 
back from her subscription and ask what value there is in having this cluster of conative, 
affective and behavioural dispositions. It is in these moments of calm reflection, when 
she entertains the possibility of shedding her inclination to hold herself and others to 
the prohibition on stealing, that the problem-of-sociality justification does its work. 
 
I hope this clarification shows that the justificatory appeal to social breakdown is not as 
eccentric as it may appear in White’s example; but it does not directly address the 
problem of the free-rider. For it remains true that peace and productivity depend on the 
subscription to moral standards of most but not all people. A handful of non-subscribers, 
though certainly troublesome, will not fatally compromise the enterprise of averting 
conflict and sustaining cooperation. So it appears to be an option for rational agents 
merely to feign subscription to moral standards, while actually being willing to violate 
them whenever their interests are served by doing so and the chances of detection are 
low. They can then enjoy the benefits of belonging to a community of moral subscribers 
without having to pay the costs of subscription themselves. They can, that is to say, free-
ride on the morality of others. 
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In fact, however, free-riding on morality is not an option for rational agents, at least not 
for rational agents with recognisably human interests and sympathies. Three 
considerations count against it, and collectively they are decisive. The first is the obvious 
point that, if everyone reasoned like the free-rider and opted merely to feign 
subscription to moral standards, the enterprise of averting conflict and sustaining 
cooperation would soon collapse. There is plainly something amiss with a reason for 
action that only looks plausible if most people are unmoved by it.  
 
The second point is that feigning moral subscription is rather more difficult than it first 
appears. To subscribe to moral standards is to have a stable set of conative, affective and 
behavioural dispositions, to be the sort of person who intends to conduct herself in a 
certain way, habitually does conduct herself in that way, and feels ashamed of herself 
when she does not. Successfully convincing others that one is a person of that sort, when 
in fact one lacks these dispositions and is entirely at ease with conduct that violates the 
standards, is no mean feat. The pretence must be kept up more or less continuously and 
with more or less everyone, including those with whom one has intimate personal or 
familial relationships. To borrow terms from David Gauthier (1986), human beings may 
not be transparent (that is, such that their dispositions are fully and unmistakeably 
accessible to others), but they are at least translucent (that is, such that their 
dispositions are at least partially and defeasibly accessible to others). It is easy enough 
to pretend to be something one is not in a brief meeting with a stranger, but our 
translucency makes it difficult to maintain the illusion for long or with close 
acquaintances, let alone permanently and with all acquaintances. The cost of feigning 
subscription to moral standards, in terms of the effort required to keep up the pretence, 
may be significantly higher than the cost of actually subscribing. 
 
Third, and most importantly, the case for free-riding rests on the false assumption that 
human beings are purely self-interested. Even if the cost of feigning subscription to 
moral standards is lower than the cost of actually subscribing, this calculation leaves out 
of account the cost to others of the free-rider’s violations. But human beings are 
sympathetic as well as self-interested. Our sympathy is limited, to be sure, but it is a 
salient feature of our motivational set. And it plays an important role in the problem-of-
sociality justification for morality. The good reason I have for subscribing to basic moral 
standards is that their currency in society makes life safer and easier for me and 
everyone else. Because I am strongly invested in my own welfare and at least somewhat 
invested in the welfare of others, the fact that everyone benefits from my moral 
subscription is a significant part of its rational appeal. My prudential and altruistic 
preferences are in alignment in my judgment that subscription is justified. Moral free-
riding only looks attractive to those unmoved by the harmful impact of moral violations 
on others; and that is not what human beings are like. 
 
The alternative accounts 
 
I turn, finally, to the alternative accounts of moral education proposed by White and 
Tillson. Here I must be brief: I shall do no more than indicate what I take to be the 
principal deficiencies in their proposals. 
 
White’s recommendations for moral educators are, in fact, strikingly similar to my own. 
We both think moral education should involve cultivating children’s subscription to 
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basic moral standards, and that children can and should be given good reasons for 
subscribing to these standards. We differ only on what we take those good reasons to be. 
For me, they arise from our collective need to ameliorate the problem of sociality; for 
White, they arise simply from concern for the wellbeing of others: 
 
What I do say is that [basic moral] rules are so fundamental that every society needs 
them, and I itemise dispositions not to lie, break promises, harm people physically or 
mentally, in the list of dispositions that I think should constitute an education in 
altruism. My argument is not, therefore, that education in altruism should replace 
the content of moral education as Hand understands it, but that it should incorporate 
it. It does this by giving not lying (etc.) a rationale in terms of the protection or 
promotion of people’s wellbeing and building up dispositions directed towards these. 
(White, 2016, pp.456-7) 
 
My theory of moral education explicitly allows for the possibility that there may be other 
good arguments, besides the problem-of-sociality justification, for subscribing to basic 
moral standards. If there is a good argument premised solely on concern for the 
wellbeing of others, then I should happily endorse its promulgation, alongside the 
problem-of-sociality justification, in moral inquiry. Unfortunately, White does not spell 
out the argument he has in mind, and I am not sure how it would run. If sympathy or 
concern for others were sufficiently stable, motivating and catholic in scope, it is not 
clear why we should need moral standards at all. The necessity for universally-enlisting 
and penalty-endorsing subscription to standards arises because our sympathies are 
limited, in the sense of being unevenly distributed and only intermittently motivating. 
Hume puts the point like this: 
 
[The poets] easily perceived, if every man had tender regard for another, or if nature 
supplied abundantly all our wants and desires, that the jealousy of interest, which 
justice supposes, could no longer have place; nor would there be any occasion for 
those distinctions and limits of property and possession, which at present are in use 
among mankind. Encrease to a sufficient degree the benevolence of men, or the 
bounty of nature, and you render justice useless, by supplying its place with much 
nobler virtues, and more valuable blessings. (Hume, 1896 [1739], pp.494-5) 
 
Perhaps White’s argument takes this into account, and couples a reliance on concern for 
the wellbeing of others with a recognition that sympathies are limited and resources 
moderately scarce, making it necessary to supplement altruistic concern with moral 
obligation. But, if so, I am at a loss to know how his preferred justification for basic 
moral standards is supposed to differ from mine. 
 
Tillson’s approach is rather different. Whereas White and I agree that there are good 
reasons educators can present to children for subscribing to a determinate set of basic 
moral standards, Tillson appears to reject this idea. He proposes, instead, that moral 
educators should proceed by a method of reflective equilibrium that helps children to 
render coherent the set of moral judgments and principles to which they are intuitively 
drawn. Fairly obviously, insofar as different children are intuitively drawn to different 
moral judgments and principles, the coherent moral schemes they end up with will be 
different too. Tillson does not shrink from this conclusion: 
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It may be that people start off with different intuitions, and that the process will just 
bring people to different systems in light of that; this is a legitimate worry that I 
cannot completely defuse. Indeed, while we might attempt to persuade one another, 
there is no guarantee that we will all be able to converge in our opinions through 
rational discourse. (Tillson, 2017, p.178)  
 
Tillson’s account seems to me unsatisfactory for three reasons. First, and most 
obviously, I think there are sound non-moral reasons for subscribing to basic moral 
standards that are quite independent of children’s moral intuitions. We do children a 
serious educational disservice if we fail to acquaint them with those reasons. 
 
Second, the recommended procedure of reflective equilibrium is only a way of rendering 
a set of moral judgments and principles internally coherent; but internal coherence 
carries no justificatory weight. If the moral judgments and principles to which a child is 
intuitively drawn are all quite wrongheaded, then no amount of moving back and forth 
between them, no amount of adjusting, balancing and reconciling, will serve to justify 
the resulting moral scheme. The scheme one gets out of a reflective equilibrium 
procedure is only as justified as the judgments and principles one puts into it. A child 
raised to be morally appalled by masturbation, premarital sex, oral sex and 
homosexuality may have no difficulty in rendering her moral intuitions internally 
coherent, but it hardly follows that her highly restrictive sexual morality is justified. 
 
And third, Tillson mysteriously ignores the part of moral education that determines 
children’s moral intuitions in the first place: moral formation. What a child finds morally 
objectionable or commendable, repugnant or admirable, depends on the moral 
formation she receives in the earliest years of life – the things she is instructed to do and 
prohibited from doing, the things for which she is rewarded and punished, the things for 
which she sees others being praised or condemned. A fundamental aim of my own 
account of moral education, and I think of White’s too, is to furnish parents and teachers 
with guidance on the proper content of moral formation, not just on the methods and 
purposes of moral inquiry. But Tillson sidesteps the question of formation entirely, 
treating children’s moral reactions and inclinations as givens, as the data with which 
they will work in their moral inquiries. That evasion rather reduces the interest of his 
account. 
 
I am grateful to White and Tillson for their close engagement with my theory of moral 
education; in my judgment, however, the objections they raise miss their mark, and the 
alternatives they offer do not pass muster. 
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